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Abstract 
 
There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of 
public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and 
distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the 
non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when 
preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that 
both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by 
deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing 
strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a 
role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision 
are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in 
a very special case. 
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1 Introduction
Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool in everyday government decision making on public
projects. When carried out in practice, the dominating view seems to be that the costs of a
tax-funded project should be adjusted according to the marginal cost of funds (MCF), as a close
reflection of the deadweight loss that will materialize if the project is added to the budget.1
Today, the theoretical foundation for such a practice is less clear.
The simple view described above originates from the pioneering papers by Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). They argued that the famous Samuelson rule
– which equates the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good of all citizens
to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) – relies on an unrealistic first-best setting where
individual lump sum taxes are available. Instead, they base their analyses on distortionary
taxation and arrive at a modified Samuelson rule where the eﬀective cost of public goods is
identified as MCF times MRT. This ‘standard approach’ has been very influential and also
underlies the excellent survey of Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
The standard approach has since been further developed by allowing for multiple house-
holds with heterogenous earnings abilities and by integrating the government spending side
more thoroughly in the analysis (Dahlby, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001; Gahvari, 2006;
Kleven and Kreiner, 2006). Two important conclusions emerge from these extensions. First,
the evaluation of public projects should take account, not only of the distortionary eﬀect of
taxation as reflected by the MCF, but also of government revenue eﬀects stemming from behav-
ioral responses generated by the expenditure side of the projects. For example, a government
investment in infrastructure or child care may increase working hours, and thereby tax revenue.
Second, distributional concerns become important for the optimal level of public goods. It
matters how benefits and costs are distributed across households.
In contrast, the ‘new approach’ to the optimal provision of public goods argues that dis-
tributional concerns are irrelevant to the evaluation of public projects. This line of research,
initiated by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and further pursued by Christiansen (1981) and
1See, for example, Boardman et al. (2006) p. 104. Evaluation of tax-funded public projects in Denmark
assumes that the cost of financing is 1.2 times the actual expenditures, corresponding to the oﬃcial Danish
marginal cost of funds (the Danish Ministry of Transportation and Energy, 2003).
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Kaplow (1996), holds that unintended distributional eﬀects can be undone by the income tax.
Their analyses apply the benefit principle, which, relying on the flexibility of the non-linear
income tax, implies that each individual contributes to the financing of a public good corre-
sponding to her own marginal willingness to pay.2 Formally, Christiansen (1981), in the context
of the optimal non-linear income tax, and Kaplow (1996), for a general tax function, have shown
that this principle restores the original Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in leisure
and goods (including public goods). This somewhat surprising result arises because the eﬀects
on individual behavior from the benefit side and from the cost side of a government project
cancel each other out, implying that a change in government consumption has no indirect eﬀects
on tax revenue. Interestingly, the result is in line with the idea of Musgrave (1959) that the
redistributive and allocative branches of government may be dealt with separately.
The divergent results of the traditional approach and of the new approach have created
a state of confusion as illustrated by the debate in the wake of Kaplow’s (2004) survey (see
Goulder et al., 2005, and the reply by Kaplow). One reason for this confusion may simply be
that the underlying analyses appear to be very diﬀerent (Christiansen, 2007). Another likely
reason is that the new approach has been inextricably linked to the restrictive separability
assumption on preferences, although the underlying benefit principle applies generally.
The fundamental diﬀerence between the two approaches lies in the assumption made about
the financing of the public good. Unlike the new approach, the standard approach makes no
general assumptions about the way the project is financed. In particular, there is no direct
link between the distribution of the benefits and the distribution of the financing burden of the
project. An argument in favor of this approach is that the income tax is not suﬃciently flexible
to exploit the information about the distribution of the benefits from the public good. However,
the lack of restrictions on the financing scheme has the potential drawback of leading way to
distributional concerns that are unrelated to the public goods problem itself. As a result,
government consumption may become a means to compensate for a lack of appropriate tax
instruments. In contrast, the new approach follows the tradition in analyses of optimal taxation
by assuming away exogenous restrictions on the instruments available to the government, except
2The benefit principle does not imply that a given public project must be financed by a scheme that keeps
everyone’s utility unchanged. It simply asserts that a public project should be completed whenever a Pareto
improvement is possible. This occurs if the reform studied raises government revenue.
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the restriction that innate abilities cannot be observed and taxed directly. This eliminates any
distributional concerns due to the specifics of the financing scheme.
This paper contributes in diﬀerent ways to the literature on optimal provision of public
goods. First, we generalize previous results in both the standard approach and the new approach
by considering a very general framework that accounts for heterogeneity in both earnings and
preferences and allows for home production through Beckerian type household consumption
technologies.
Second, we use the framework to reconcile the results of the two approaches. The traditional
approach addresses the problem of optimal provision by examining whether a budget-neutral
expansion of government consumption raises social welfare. The new approach, on the other
hand, considers an expansion of government consumption together with an adjustment of the
non-linear income tax that keeps everybody at the same utility level (the benefit principle). The
optimality criterion then becomes whether government revenue increases or not. We demon-
strate, using a simple duality property, that both approaches derive from the same basic formula,
requiring that a public project is completed only when the social marginal benefit of the project
(SMBP) exceeds the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF).
Third, and most importantly, we contribute to the new approach by deriving a fully general,
intuitive formula for the optimal level of public goods without imposing strong assumptions on
preferences. The formula is simple to derive and shows that distortionary taxation may have a
role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision
are very diﬀerent, and we demonstrate that the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF
only obtains in a very special case where the willingness to pay for the public good is linear in
ability.
Our general formula identifies the partial correlation between ability and the marginal will-
ingness to pay for the public good as the driving force behind any deviations from the Samuelson
rule. That is, public goods provision should only be less (more) than the Samuelson rule predicts
if high ability individuals have a higher (lower) marginal willingness to pay for the public good
– when evaluated at a given earnings level. We may observe that high earning, high ability
individuals have a higher willingness to pay for the public good. However, if this correlation is
driven entirely by the eﬀect of income on the willingness to pay (as is the case with a standard
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normal good) the Samuelson rule still applies. Only a partial eﬀect directly from ability to the
willingness to pay leads to a departure from the Samuelson rule since any correlations with
income can be made distributionally neutral through appropriate adjustments of the income
tax. This result is related to Boadway and Keen (1993) who showed in a two-type optimal tax
framework that the Samuelson rule should be modified according to the degree of complemen-
tary/substitutability between leisure and the marginal willingness to pay. Our reform-based
approach does not require that the income tax system is optimal. Further, their main result
does not generalize to our setting, but we show that our general formula may be reformulated
to a relationship between leisure and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good when
we confine the analysis to a labour-leisure framework with homogeneous preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model with a continuum of agents
and preference heterogeneity. Section 3 derives a general formula for the optimal level of a
public good when the financing scheme is not linked to the benefit distribution as in the stan-
dard approach. Section 4 shows the relationship between the standard approach and the new
approach, and derives a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good when
marginal tax changes are governed by the benefit principle. In Section 5 we provide a spe-
cial case where the two approaches lead to identical results, and where the simple, traditional
formula with its emphasis on MCF applies. Finally, Section 6 discusses policy implications.
2 The Framework
This section presents a general framework to analyze the optimal provision of public goods.
The model has a continuum of agents, each characterized by an innate ability , which is also
our index of identification. The distribution of abilities across the population is given by the
non-degenerate density function  (). Each agent derives utility from private consumption
 and from public goods  provided by the public sector. Both  and  could be thought of
as either a vector of consumption goods or a single composite good. Gross earnings or, more
generally, taxable income is denoted , and acquiring income imposes a utility loss on the agent.
The utility of agent  equals
 (   )  (1)
4
where  ≡   0,   0,   0, and  (·) is quasiconcave. This utility specification
embodies preference heterogeneity across individuals of diﬀerent abilities. It also encompasses
the traditional Mirrleesian specification,  (  ), as a special case. The term  builds on
the notion that more able persons must exert less eﬀort to attain a given income level. If this
logic is extended to other domains of everyday life, as in Becker (1965), it seems natural that
ability also has an impact on the utility of consuming, as long as the skills of home production
are correlated with market productivity. The theory of household production views market
goods as an input in a production process, which, along with individual skills, determines the
output that ultimately enters individual utility. Thus, persons of diﬀerent skills may benefit
diﬀerently from a given input of  or . For instance, an individual’s ability to cook determines
the utility derived from a basket of groceries. Similarly, the utility derived from public goods
such as the police or the judicial system depends on both the skill and the need to benefit
from such institutions, which is likely influenced by individual ability. Thus, the formulation
in (1) captures both innate preference diﬀerences between individuals of diﬀerent abilities and
preference diﬀerences due to the technology of home production.
Since the government cannot condition taxes on the unobservable ability, it is forced to
operate a (possibly) non-linear income tax function  ( ), where  is a shift parameter used
to capture the eﬀects of changes to the tax function. Consumption equals  = − ( ) which,
together with the utility function (1), give
MRS ( ) ≡ −
0 [ −  ( )    ]
0 [ −  ( )    ]  0 (2)
MRS ( ) ≡ 
0 [ −  ( )    ]
0 [ −  ( )    ]  0 (3)
which measure the marginal rates of substitution between, respectively,  and  and  and  for
a type  individual at the income level . Notice that an increase in the ability level aﬀects the
MRS’s both directly and indirectly through an impact on the earnings level . This distinction
turns out to be important for the results.
The first-order conditions for the optimal choices of  and  imply
MRS [ ()  ] = 1− (4)
where  () denotes the optimal income level and  ≡  ( ()  )  is the marginal tax rate
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at that income level. The indirect utility function is  () ≡  [ ()    ()  ] and gives the
utility level of individual  when consumption and labor supply are chosen optimally. We follow
the standard approach in optimal taxation and contract theory and assume (i) that utility is
increasing in ability,   0, and (ii) that the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is
satisfied (e.g., Salanié, 2003):
MRS ( )   0. (5)
The first assumption along with the Envelope Theorem ensures that the indirect utility is
increasing in ability,  =   0. The second assumption ensures that the tax system
is implementable, i.e., that higher ability individuals always choose higher equilibrium earnings,
implying that the government can use income as a signal of the underlying ability.
The government cares about redistribution as well as the provision of public goods. The
preferences of the government are captured by a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function of
the form
Ω =
Z

Ψ [ ()]  ()  (6)
where Ψ (·) is a concave function reflecting the distributional concerns of the policymaker. The
marginal rate of transformation between private goods and public goods (MRT) is normalized
to one, without any loss of generality. The government budget constraint then becomes
 ≡
Z

 ( )  () −  ≥ 0
where the public goods nature of  is seen from the fact that  enters only once in the government
budget constraint but still appears in everyone’s utility functions.
A reform is characterized by two parameters: the change in the supply of the public good 
and an associated adjustment of the tax function . Diﬀerentiating (6) and using the first-order
condition (4) yields the eﬀect of a marginal reform, ( ), on social welfare
Ω
 = −
Z

 ()  ( )  () + 
Z

 () 
0
0  ()  (7)
where  ≡ RΨ0 (·)0 (·)  ()  is the average social marginal utility of income in society and
 () ≡ Ψ0[(·)]0(·) is the social marginal welfare weight of agent . Similarly, the eﬀect of a
reform on government revenue is given by
 = 
Z

 ( )
  () −  +
Z


µ
 +


¶
 ()  (8)
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where the first two terms are the direct revenue eﬀects while the last term captures the eﬀect
of behavioral responses on government revenue. These behavioral responses are driven both by
changes to the tax schedule and by eﬀects of government consumption on household utility.
3 The Standard Approach
The standard view of optimal public goods supply is due originally to Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974) and has exerted a tremendous influence on the practice
of cost-benefit analysis (e.g., Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). This approach to deriving a formula
for the optimal public goods supply initially does not impose any restrictions on the financing
scheme other than the requirement that the reform is fully financed, i.e.,  = 0. From eq. (8)
this yields
 =
 R h () +i  () 
1− R ()  
A marginal expansion of  is desirable if it increases social welfare, Ω ≥ 0. Insert the above
expression in (7) and apply this test to getR
  () 
0
0  () 
1− R ()  ≥
R
  ()   () R

£ + ¤  ()  (9)
The earnings choice of the household, determined by eqs (2) and (4), may be written as a
function ˆ ((1−)    ), where (1−) is the marginal net-of-tax rate and  ≡ − ( )
is virtual income. The uncompensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax
rate may then be defined as  ≡ 1− ˆ(1−) . From the Slutsky-equation, it may be decomposed
into a compensated elasticity and an income eﬀect, that is  = − where  is the compensated
elasticity and  ≡ − (1−) ˆ is the income eﬀect.3 Further, let
Φ ≡    () ≡

 
µZ


  () 
¶
 (10)
where  is the average tax rate. The parameter Φ captures the progressivity of the implied tax
reform, and  () is the share of the direct tax changes that is borne by agent . Using this we
3Previous contributions have defined hours-of-work elasticities. The elasticity of taxable income captures
hours-of-work responses as well as all other behavioral responses that are relevant for total tax payments, and
the empirical evidence indicates that this elasticity may be significantly larger than the hours-of-work elasticity
(e.g. Gruber and Saez, 2002).
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can rewrite (9) in terms of behavioral elasticities to arrive at Proposition 1.4
Proposition 1 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable iﬀR
  () ·MRS (·)  () 
1− R ()  ≥
R
  ()  ()  () R

³
1− 1− (Φ ·  − )
´
 ()  () 
 (11)
Proof: See Appendix A. ¤
Expression (11) generalizes the results of Dahlby (1998), Gahvari (2006), and Kleven and
Kreiner (2006) to a more general setting. Intuitively, a marginal expansion of the public good is
desirable when the social marginal benefit of the project (SMBP, the left-hand side) exceeds the
social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF, the right-hand side). The expression for SMCF is
equivalent to the social marginal cost of public funds derived in Dahlby (1998) with elasticities
defined on taxable income rather than more narrowly on labor supply.5
Proposition 1 demonstrates the importance of tax distortions and distributional considera-
tions for the optimal level of the public good. Without distributional weights,  () =  ∀,
and without initial tax distortions,  = 0 ∀, the Samuelson rule applies (independently of
how a marginal expansion of the public good is financed). Introducing positive marginal tax
rates implies that the optimal  may be lower or higher than prescribed by the Samuelson rule,
depending on the sizes of the behavioral eﬀects stemming from changes to the tax schedule (the
RHS denominator) and from changes to the public goods supply (the LHS denominator).
Distributional concerns aﬀect the optimal level of public goods, even in the absence of any
tax distortions. Consider, for example, the case where the aggregate willingness to pay for a
public project exceeds the total costs of the project. Such a project should be implemented
according to the original Samuelson rule but not necessarily according to the above modified rule
which depends on the financing scheme. If, for example, high-income people receive most of the
benefits and the public project is financed by a poll tax, the project might be discarded because
the distribution of welfare is worsened. However, such a conclusion ignores the flexibility of
4 In a piece-wise linear tax system, there will be bunching at the various kinks in the tax schedule. With
standard convex budget sets, this does not constitute a problem for our final results but may imply that elasticities
are zero at a kink point because marginal changes are not suﬃcient to move the individual away from the kink
point.
5Kleven and Kreiner (2006) include both intensive and extensive labor supply responses. We have chosen
to follow the tradition in analyses of the optimal provision of public goods and MCF by focusing on intensive
responses alone.
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the non-linear income tax, and thereby assigns a role to distributional considerations that are
unrelated to the problem of public goods provision (see also Auerbach and Hines, 2002). This
approach may have merit when there are exogenous constraints that limit the adjustment of
the tax schedule as emphasized by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001) and Gahvari (2006). On the
other hand, without any specific justification for constraining the tax function, it is natural to
consider a financing scheme where those who benefit from the public good also pay the extra
taxes, thereby neutralizing any distributional eﬀects. This is the direction taken by the new
approach.
4 The New Approach
The new approach evaluates the benefits of an expansion of the public good by use of the benefit
principle, introduced by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and applied by Christiansen (1981,
1999) and Kaplow (1996, 2004). When applying this principle, a (marginal) expansion of  is
financed by a benefit-oﬀsetting, or distribution-neutral, change in the tax function. Consider
Figure 1. The solid line plots individual benefits (measured in units of private consumption)
from a public project as a function of ability. Similarly, the dashed line displays one possible
way of financing the public project under the standard approach in which the tax burden is
increasing in income. In this case, the proposed financing provides an increase in the net-utility
of low-ability individuals at the expense of high-ability individuals, thus implying a change in
the distribution of welfare. In contrast, under the benefit principle the income tax schedule is
adjusted so as to keep everyone’s utility unchanged, i.e., each individual’s share of the additional
tax burden corresponds to their individual benefit in Figure 1. The public good expansion is
then desirable if the total eﬀect on government revenue is positive. This approach does not
imply that a given public project must be financed by a scheme that keeps everyone’s utility
unchanged. It simply asserts that a public project should be completed whenever a Pareto
improvement is possible.
Testing whether a marginal expansion of  that keeps everyone’s utility unchanged can raise
government revenue,  ≥ 0, is incompatible with the method used to derive the optimal level
of  in the standard approach of the previous section. Indeed, condition (9) is derived by
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considering whether a budget-neutral reform,  = 0, raises social welfare, Ω ≥ 0. Instead, we
use an alternative approach that keeps social welfare unaﬀected and determines the desirability
of a marginal expansion of  by calculating the eﬀect of the reform on government revenue.
If the eﬀect is positive, the reform is socially desirable. We show in Appendix B that the
requirements Ω = 0 and  ≥ 0 are equivalent toR
  () 
0
0  () 
1− R ()  ≥
R
  ()   () R

£ + ¤  ()  (12)
which is the same as condition (9). The fact that we arrive at the same formula as in the
standard approach is not surprising since we have merely applied a dual approach to determine
the optimal level of . Importantly, the equivalence of (9) and (12) provides a link between the
two approaches. Indeed, they both derive from the same basic formula. The diﬀerence lies only
in the assumptions made regarding the associated tax reform.
The benefit principle makes the change to the entire tax schedule endogenous, i.e., at every
income level both the direct change to the tax burden and the change in the marginal tax rate
are determined endogenously by the requirement that the utility of all individuals is unchanged,
implying that  () and 0 () are fixed. Thus, we consider a reform that aﬀects  and the tax
function  (·) such that
 () = 0 (·) + 0 (·)  + 0 (·)  = 0 for all  (13)
0 () = 00 (·) + 00 (·)  + 00 (·)  = 0 for all  (14)
where we have used that 0 () = 0 (·) because of the Envelope Theorem.
The benefit-oﬀsetting expansion of  adjusts the tax function to capture the benefits of the
additional  from each individual . To see this, diﬀerentiate the relationship  =  −  ( )
in order to get  = (1−)  − () . This expression and the first order condition (4)
enable us to write condition (13) as
 ( )
  =
0 (·)
0 (·) ·  =MRS ( ) ·  (15)
This equation shows that the increase in the tax burden of an individual with earnings  is
exactly equal to the extra benefit from the expansion of government consumption. However, as
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the tax function depends on income, not ability, the reform may have distortionary eﬀects on
the incentive to work.
The impact of the public good expansion on the incentives to supply earnings will depend
on the implicit eﬀect on the marginal tax rate implied by the above financing scheme and on
the direct eﬀect of the public good on work incentives. The total eﬀect on earnings may be
derived by combining eqs (13) and (14). This gives
 = 
00 (·)− 00 (·)0 (·) 0 (·)
−00 (·) + 00 (·)0 (·) 0 (·)
=
MRS ( ) 
MRS ( )  (16)
where the last equality follows by diﬀerentiating the definitions in eqs (2) and (3) w.r.t. . The
partial derivatives in this expression measure the eﬀect of ability on the marginal rates of substi-
tution between, respectively,  and  in the numerator and  and  in the denominator. Notice
that the single-crossing condition (5) implies that the denominator is negative and therefore
that the sign of the eﬀect is determined by MRS ( ) .
The application of the benefit principle implies that the expansion of  and the accompanying
change in the tax function keeps everyone’s utility, and thus social welfare, unchanged. Now
eq. (15) gives
R
  ()   ·  ()  =
R
  ()   ·  ()  implying that condition (12) is
equivalent to Z

∙
  +
µ
 +


¶¸
 ()  ≥  (17)
From eqs (15), (16), and (17), it is now possible to establish our main result:
Proposition 2 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable iﬀZ

µ
MRS ( ) + · MRS ( ) MRS ( ) 
¶
 ()  ≥MRT. (18)
Proof: This follows by inserting eqs (15) and (16) in condition (17). ¤
Proposition 2 shows that the Samuelson rule must be amended by a term that is aﬀected by
the partial correlation, i.e., conditional on income, between ability and the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good.6 The additional term corrects for the revenue implications of the
behavioral responses to the reform. The optimal level of  is aﬀected by correlations with the
6Williams (2005) analyzes diﬀerent public policy problems with non-separable preferences. His main goal,
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unobservable  because the tax function is constrained to depend on the imperfect signal that
is income. It is important to note that the partial eﬀects on the MRS’s in (18) are evaluated
at a given income level. Thus, variations in MRS due entirely to variations in  do not aﬀect
the optimal public goods supply. The total eﬀect of higher ability on the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good is given by
MRS ( )
 =
MRS ( )


 +
MRS ( )
 
This is illustrated on Figure 2, which displays indiﬀerence curves and the marginal rate of
substitution between private consumption and public goods. A low-ability person who has
low earnings/private consumption is at point , while a high-ability person with high earn-
ings/private consumption is at point . Assume first that the preferences of both agents are
given by the solid indiﬀerence curves 1 and 2. In this case, the high-income person has a higher
willingness to pay for the public good (MRS is larger at  than at ), which is only natural
when  is a normal good because both agents receive the same level of public good consumption
¯. This eﬀect works entirely through earnings, , and does not aﬀect the optimal level of
 since both types have the same willingness to pay when located at the same earnings/private
consumption bundle. Rather, the crucial test is whether the slope of the indiﬀerence curves of
people of diﬀerent ability diﬀer when evaluated at a given income/consumption level. This sit-
uation arises if the preferences of the high ability person are instead represented by the dashed
indiﬀerence curves 01 and 02. In this case, the high-ability person has a higher willingness to
pay at any given point, implying that the public good eﬀectively redistributes based on the
unobservable ability.
Intuitively, when marginal tax rates are positive, the supply of public goods is reduced
relative to the first best if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good increases with
ability. In this case, the benefit principle implies that higher incomes must contribute more to
the financing of the public good. However, part (or all) of the additional benefit enjoyed by
persons with higher incomes stems from their innate ability and is realized independently of the
chosen income level. Thus, the additional taxes implied by the reform reduce the incentive to
however, is to compare representative-agent and multiple-agent models. His result on public good provision with
multiple agents (eq. 24M) does not provide much guidance on whether non-separability implies more or less
provision compared to the Samuelson rule. In particular, he does not identify the crucial distinction between
income and ability in determining deviations from the Samuelson rule.
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work. The size of the additional distortion depends on the responsiveness of earned income as
captured by the denominator of the second term in (18). Also, the stronger is the influence of
ability on the marginal willingness to pay, the more diﬃcult it is for the government to finance
 in a non-distortionary fashion.7 A reversal of the above argument explains why the public
goods supply should be higher than advocated by the Samuelson rule when there is a negative
correlation between ability and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good.
The result in Proposition 2 is related to Boadway and Keen (1993) who showed in a two-type
optimal tax framework that the partial correlation between leisure and the marginal willingness
to pay determines deviations from the Samuelson rule. In our general framework, this result
does not apply. However, Proposition 2 may be reformulated to a relationship between leisure
and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good when we confine the analysis to a
labour-leisure framework with homogeneous preferences:
Corollary 1 With the individual utility specification  (   ) = ˜ (  ) where  ≡ , an
expansion of  is socially desirable wheneverZ

µ
MRS ( ) + · MRS ( ) MRS ( ) 
¶
 ()  ≥MRT.
Proof: With this utility function, we can use the relation  =  ·  to express the change in 
as a function of the dependence of MRS on  instead. Indeed,
MRS
 =
MRS


 = −
MRS


2 ⇒
MRS ( ) 
MRS ( )  =
MRS ( ) 
MRS ( ) 
Insert this in eq. (18) to arrive at the above result. ¤
When ability is restricted to aﬀect utility only through , the evaluation of a public project
departs from the Samuelson rule if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good depends
on individual labor supply. Thus, if MRS displays a negative correlation with  — for a given
income  — the optimal level of the public good is less than predicted by the Samuelson rule
(notice that the denominator in the second term under the integral is now positive). In this
7An alternative way to view this result focuses on how the concern for redistribution aﬀects the optimal level
of . When persons of higher ability benefit relatively more from the presence of the public good, the supply
of  adversely aﬀects the government’s scope for redistribution. Indeed, the public good eﬀectively redistributes
in favor of the rich. This point applies the same logic as do Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Blackorby
and Donaldson (1988) in the context of in kind transfers and Saez (2002) in the context of optimal commodity
taxation.
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case, the public good is valued relatively more by those who must deliver fewer working hours
to attain a given income, i.e., people of higher ability. Therefore, the public good impacts
negatively on the government’s ability to redistribute income. However, the opposite situation
is equally plausible. When MRS increases with  the optimal  is higher than indicated by the
Samuleson rule. Finally, note that the correlation with working hours is only a suﬃcient statistic
when the utility function has the shape considered in Corollary 2. It does not necessarily carry
over to the general utility function (1).
Proposition 2 also clarifies when the original Samuelson rule obtains. The suﬃcient condition
is that there is no partial eﬀect from ability to the willingness to pay for the public good. Thus,
the crucial question for the determination of the optimal  is whether the marginal willingness
to pay is diﬀerent for a person of high ability when she imitates the choices of a lower ability
individual. If this is not the case, implying that people of diﬀerent ability have the same MRS
for given , the Samuelson rule applies and distributional considerations should not aﬀect the
level of the public good. This does not rule out that people of diﬀerent ability, as they position
themselves at diﬀerent income levels, have diﬀerent willingness to pay in equilibrium. In this
case, the financing of the public good is not uniform under the benefit principle and, as a result,
marginal tax rates are aﬀected. But these tax variations are not distortionary as the marginal
willingness to pay also varies with income. Diﬀerential financing is only distortionary when
taxpayers can avoid the additional burden without reducing the benefit they enjoy from the
public good. Thus, armed with Proposition 2 we can generalize the result of Kaplow (1996) to
a more general class of utility functions:8
Corollary 2 Assume that individual utility satisfies the separability assumption:  (   ) =
˜ £1 (  )  2 ( )¤. Then an expansion of  is socially desirable whenever the Samuelson
condition holds, i.e., Z

MRS ()  ≥MRT.
Proof: The marginal willingness to pay for  is MRS = 
0
1(·)10 (·)
01(·)10 (·) =
10 ()
10 () , which is
8Note that  = ˜ ( ( )  ), which is used in Kaplow (1996), is a special case of the utility function in
Corollary 2, where 1 (  ) = ˜1 ( ) and 2 ( ) = . A related issue concerns the importance of
separability in establishing whether the second-best level is above or below the first-best level. Gaube (2000)
explores this issue in a public goods context while Gauthier and Laroque (2008) consider a general second best
environment.
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independent of . Thus, MRS = 0 implying that (18) reduces to the Samuelson rule. ¤
The above utility specification implies that variations in the marginal willingness to pay for the
public good derive from income directly, not the underlying ability (MRS = 0). If the
marginal willingness to pay increases with income, the benefit principle implies that marginal
tax rates increase as a result of the reform but these changes are not distortionary as the
individual benefit from the public good also increases with income (see Blomquist et al., 2008,
for a similar point).
5 A Special Case: Simple MCF Correction
Generally, the formula for the optimal  deviates from Proposition 2 when the associated tax
reform is not governed by the benefit principle. Thus, the standard approach generally leads
to diﬀerent results than those obtained in the previous section. However, in one special case
the two approaches are equivalent and the simplest form of the standard formula obtains. The
latter holds that public goods should be expanded ifZ

MRS ·  ()  ≥MCF ·MRT,
where MCF is the marginal cost of raising public funds. This simple version of the modified
Samuelson rule focuses only on the distortionary eﬀects of raising taxes and disregards distrib-
utional concerns. We now show that there is a special case where this simple formula obtains
using the new approach.
Assume utility is given by
 = +  ·  ()−  ·  ()  (19)
where the functional form of the disutility of labor is taken from Saez (2001) and implies that
 reflects potential earnings, i.e., without any tax system the individual chooses  = . The
crucial feature of the preference specification is that utility from the public good is rising linearly
in ability. If we depart from this functional form, the simple standard formula does not obtain.
With the utility function (19), Proposition 2 implies that a marginal expansion of  is
desirable iﬀ (see Appendix C)Z

MRS
µ
1− 
1−
¶
 ()  ≥MRT (20)
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where  is the (compensated) elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
This formula identifies MCF as a central determinant of the optimal . If, in addition, the
income tax system is linear initially and the elasticity of taxable income is constant across
individuals, the condition simplifies toZ

MRS ·  ()  ≥ 1
1− 1−
·MRT =MCF ·MRT,
which is identical to the most simple version of the modified Samuelson rule (Browning, 1987,
Dahlby, 1998, and Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). However, only when utility from the public
good is linear in ability and the initial tax system is proportional is this traditional MCF
correction valid.
6 Policy Implications
The standard approach provides the most general answer to the question of the optimal public
goods supply in an economy with distortionary taxation. However, most policy makers would
probably find Proposition 1 of limited practical relevance. A cost-benefit analysis based on that
proposition requires information about the social welfare weights of diﬀerent income groups,
knowledge of earnings responses to changes in taxation and to changes in the public goods
supply, as well as a specification of the underlying tax reform used to finance the public good.
In particular, it is hard to find conclusive evidence on the appropriate social welfare weights.
Instead, many real-world cost-benefit analyses are based on a simple MCF-correction of the
Samuelson rule. Section 5 showed that this approach implicitly puts very strong assumptions on
the utility function. In particular, it is assumed that the willingness to pay is linearly increasing
in ability, conditional on income. As the examples below illustrate, this hardly seems a natural
benchmark for public good decisions in general.
The new approach represents a way to simplify the problem of optimal provision. As long
as the income tax is suﬃciently flexible, we can neutralize any distributional eﬀects and use
the Pareto criterion to evaluate whether the public good should be expanded. This is in line
with the ideas of Musgrave (1959). In this case, Proposition 2 shows that the optimal supply
of public goods follows a modified Samuelson rule where the modification is determined by
the correlation between ability and the willingness to pay for the public good, conditional on
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income.
However, the new approach faces the central challenge that correlations between the mar-
ginal willingness to pay and, respectively, ability and income are observationally equivalent but
have vastly diﬀerent policy implications as first noted by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). For
instance, are wealthy people overrepresented among opera audiences because they are wealthy,
or because they are of higher ability? For some purposes, casual observation may be suﬃcient
to decide on the desirability of a public project but in general it is diﬃcult to distinguish empir-
ically between initiate ability and income – a feature that also underlies the main assumption
behind optimal income taxation.9
For instance, police protection and the safety it provides might be an example of a public
good where the willingness to pay is increasing in income/wealth but where there is no clear
relationship between willingness to pay and ability (for a given income level). Then the original
Samuelson rule provides the best benchmark for the optimal level of expenditures on public
safety (Corollary 2).
In contrast, education seems to be an example of a good that is valued higher by the
more able, even conditional on income. Presumably, people of higher innate ability are better
equipped to benefit from educational training. If so, the optimal public financial support for
education is less than the Samuelson rule predicts because such support eﬀectively redistributes
income towards the more able.10 Correspondingly, public transportation is likely to benefit
persons of lower ability more for a given income. Eﬃcient public transportation reduces the
travel time to and from the workplace, leaving more time for other activities. A low ability
individual must work longer hours to uphold a given income and therefore, presumably, values
her sparetime more compared to a higher ability individual with the same workload. Thus,
subsidies to public transportation eﬀectively redistribute income towards the less able, over and
above what is attainable through the income tax. Importantly, consumption patterns across
incomes do not necessarily reveal the desirability of public transport subsidies. If low income
9The identification problem is not easily solved. Basically, we need to identify the marginal willingness to pay
for the public good of a high-ability type when he mimics the income choice of a low-ability type. This requires
knowledge about out-of-equilibrium outcomes.
10Education is, of course, not a pure public good but our argument also applies to externalities as discussed
below. Note also that redistributive policies may discourage private investments in education, creating a second-
best argument in favor of subsidizing education (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
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individuals choose public transport because they cannot aﬀord a car, not because they are of
low skill, the Samuelson rule still applies.
In order to rely on the new approach, we need the income tax system to be suﬃciently
flexible. But in practice there may be several constraints that limit the adjustment of the income
tax as emphasized by e.g. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001). For example, the implementation of a
progressive tax system in developing countries is hampered by the diﬃculty of taxing income
directly (Gordon and Li, 2005). In this light, let us reconsider our previous example of police
protection and safety which primarily benefits the rich. When exogenous constraints prevent
us from raising the desired extra revenue from the rich, we can no longer simply apply the
Samuelson rule as advocated by the new approach. Instead, an expansion of the spending on
public safety inevitably redistributes welfare from the poor to the rich. In this case, we need to
apply the standard approach, which requires information on welfare weights etc.
Finally, while the analysis in this paper has focused on public goods, the results may be
directly applied to the correction of externalities. We may think of  as a global externality
and MRS as the willingness to pay for a marginal reduction of the externality. The cost of
reducing  is then the costs of, e.g., abatement or alternative production methods. As argued
by Kaplow and Shavell (2002), the most eﬃcient way to regulate externalities is through a price
scheme that reflects marginal harm. When consumption patterns diﬀer across individuals, the
costs and benefits of such a scheme may be unevenly distributed. However, any distributional
eﬀects that are driven by preference variations due directly to income can be undone through
adjustments of the income tax (see also Kaplow, 2006). Only when the willingness to pay for
harm reduction is correlated with ability should the externality correction depart from first best
rules.11
11 If the externality is not global but aﬀects only part of the population, it is necessary for the results that the
income tax can follow the same demographic patterns. For instance, pollution in a major city mainly aﬀects its
citizens and compensation schemes must then be designed to aﬀect only the citizens of that same city. This is
possible if regional taxes are in place and can be adjusted freely. However, local tax functions are often subject
to constitutional restrictions. In this case, and when the externality aﬀects subsets of the population that cannot
be explicitly targeted, the benefit principle can no longer be applied and alternative methods must be used.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The eﬀect of the tax reform on government revenue is

 =
Z

∙
 + ·


¸
 () 
which is identical to the denominator on the right-hand side of (9). Using the earnings function
ˆ (·) and noting that the shift parameter  only aﬀects the marginal net-of-tax rate and virtual
income (but not ), we may write the earnings response as

 =
ˆ


 −
ˆ
 (1−)

 
which decomposes the eﬀect on earnings into an income eﬀect and an eﬀect from the change in
the tax rate. The change in virtual income is

 = 

 +

 −

 −
 ( )
 = 
µ
 −


¶

where  ≡  ( )  is the average tax rate and  ≡  () . This implies that the
earnings response above may be rewritten to

 =
∙ˆ

µ
 −


¶
− 1
1−


¸

where  ≡ 1− ˆ(1−) is the uncompensated elasticity of taxable income. From the Slutsky-
equation, it may be written as  =  −  where  is the compensated elasticity and  ≡
− (1−) ˜ is an income eﬀect. Using this relationship, the above expression becomes

 =
µ
 − 


¶
1
1−
which implies

 =
Z

∙
1 +

1−
µ
 −  

¶¸ 
  () 
Insert this in the denominator on the right-hand side of (9) and use the definitions (10) in order
to obtain formula (11) in Proposition 1.
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B Derivation of Equation (12)
From eq. (7) and the condition Ω = 0 we get
 =
R
  ()  ·  ·  () R
  () 
0
0  () 

We may rewrite eq. (8) as
 =
Z


∙
 +


¸
 () − 
µ
1−
Z

 () 
¶

Insert  from above and apply the criterion  ≥ 0 to get (12).
C Derivation of Equation (20)
We start by deriving  from eq. (16). With the utility function (19), we have 00 = 0,
00 = 0 (·), and the first-order condition for the choice of earnings (4) implies
0 (·) = 1− =⇒  (1−) =

00 (·) 
which gives the (compensated) elasticity of earned income w.r.t. the take-home rate as
 ≡  (1−)  (1−) =
0 (·)
00 (·) 
The cross-derivative 00 then becomes
00 = 00 (·) 2 = (1−)
1

1
 
By inserting this relationship and 00 = 0 into (16), we obtain
 = −
1−  · 
where we have used MRS =  ·0 (). By substituting the above expression and eq. (15) into
condition (17), we obtain the inequality (20).
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